Antonio José Pagán Sánchez
Researcher at the Center for China and Asia-Pacific Studies
Universidad del Pacífico (Lima, Peru)
The 4th Ministerial Meeting of the China–CELAC Forum, held in Beijing last week, once again underscored the importance that the Asian country attaches to the region and its utility in enhancing its soft power. Soft power refers to the ability to influence others through attraction and persuasion, as opposed to hard power, which is based on coercion and the use of military or economic resources.
This meeting marked the 10th anniversary of the first Ministerial Meeting, without representing a major change compared to previous occasions. On the other hand, although the delegations with the highest level of political representation were those of Brazil, Chile, and Colombia, headed by their respective presidents, Peru emerged as one of the main beneficiaries of one of the most notable announcements of the meeting.This consisted of a visa exemption for citizens of several Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay), who, starting in June, will be able to enter China without a visa for up to 30
days.
The measure is part of a policy that China has been implementing since 2023 to attract international tourism from selected countries in the context of its economic slowdown. Beyond facilitating tourism and cultural exchanges, the initiative also reinforces the narrative of an open China committed to the region, especially amid greater assertiveness from the U.S. administration. In addition, China announced the promotion of cultural exchanges, support for sustainable projects, and expanded cooperation for development.
Statements from the Chinese side also revealed Beijing’s interest in using the forum to strengthen its image vis-à-vis that of the United States, in a context of political and trade tensions and of Washington’s growing economic displacement by Beijing in the region. In a veiled reference to Donald Trump, Xi Jinping stated during his opening speech that “bullying and hegemonism only lead to self-isolation,” echoing remarks made hours earlier by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi that Latin America “is no one’s backyard.”
The economic slowdown currently affecting China has also been reflected in the cooperation pledges announced by the Chinese side. Thus, the $9.2 billion credit line unveiled by Beijing is notably smaller than the $20 billion it pledged a decade ago to facilitate Chinese investment in infrastructure projects across Latin America. It is striking that this figure has not increased,
especially when considered against the backdrop of the present context of intensifying Sino–U.S. rivalry.
Finally, in terms of overseas investment, Beijing benefits from the considerable scale of its state-owned enterprises, over which Chinese authorities maintain a degree of influence that the United States and its European allies simply do not exercise over the private companies in their own countries. A clear example of such investment—without going any further—is the Port of Chancay, in which COSCO holds a 60% stake, a project that has been met with critical scrutiny from the United States. It remains to be seen whether the so-called “Chancay-to-Shanghai” route can be fully realized without provoking a negative reaction from the incoming
U.S. administration.
